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THE COURT OF APPEALS, 1953 TERM
agreement fails to do so and the agreement itself remains un-
impeached.
In addition, when the separation agreement is incorporated
in a divorce decree of a sister state, it becomes part of the decree 5
as in lhe instant cases, and therefore it becomes entitled to full
faith and credit.0 Consequently an allocation can not be made by a
New York court as it would substantially impair the rights estab-
lished in the prior decree.7
VIII. INSURANCE
Airline Trip Insurance
An often noted aspect of modern commercial distribution is
the increased use of automatic vending machines as purveyors
of myriad goods and services. Not the least imaginative use of
these devices is in the sale of short-term policies of specific-risk
life insurance. The attendant consequences of possibly mislead-
ing advertising, and its effect on construction of the insurance
policy, together with the difficulty of applying proverbial doc-
trines of contract law where the offeror is a mechanical agent,
were the subject of decision in Laohs v. Fidelity & Casualty Co.
of New York.1
Decedent had purchased an insurance policy from such a
machine located in front of the ticket counter at Newark Airport.
In letters ten times larger than any other words on the machine,
prominently lighted, were the words: "Airline Trip Insurance."
This legend was repeated several times in smaller print on the
machine and in the application. Across the face of the policy,
which consisted of twenty-two inches of printed matter, in large
type, appeared the words: "This Policy Is Limited To Aircraft
Accidents Read It Carefully." But the policy was accompanied
by an envelope, presumably to permit the purchaser to mail it
immediately.
The coverage clause in the policy provided that the insurance
would apply only to injuries sustained by reason of a flight on a
"Scheduled Airline", defined in the clause as "a Civilian Sched-
uled Airline maintaining regular, published schedules and licensed
for . . . transportation of passengers . . .
4. Harwood v. Harwood, 182 Misc. 130, 49 N.Y. S. 2d 727, (Sup. Ct), aff'd,
268 App. Div. 974, 52 N. Y. S. 2d 573 (1st Dep't 1944) ; Cogswell v. Cogswell, 130 Misc.
541, 224 N.Y. Supp. 59 (Sup. Ct. 1927).
5. 1 NELSON, DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT § 13.51 (2d ed. 1945).
6. 3 NELSON, DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT §§ 33.20, 3324 (2d ed. 1945).
7. Schacht v. Schacht, 295 N.Y. 439, 68 N.E. 2d 433 (1946).
1. 306 N.Y. 357, 118 N.E. 2d 555 (1954).
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Hanging on the wall at the end of the counter where decedent
picked up her ticket was a "fairly large" sign captioned: "Non-
Scheduled Air Carriers Authorized to Conduct Business In This
Terminal." There followed a list of ten airlines, included among
which was the airline upon which decedent was to travel and
meet her death. There was no proof that decedent saw the sign,
and the court viewed it as irrelevant, for . . . applicants for
insurance are not affected with notice by reason of wall signs nor
do they incorporate words or definitions from wall signs into their
insurance contracts." 2
When the language employed in a contract is ambiguous or
equivocal, and its interpretation depends upon external factors,
it becomes a mixed question of law and fact for the jury.3 Th
burden is ol the insurer to establish that the words must be con-
strued as the insurer suggests, and that no other interpretation
is possible.4 The court here attached great significance to the
position of the vending machine in front of the ticket counter
"utilized by all non-scheduled airlines operating out of the New-
ark Airport." The court found that in view of all the circum-
stances, a jury could find that the insurer was inviting passengers
on non-scheduled airlines to insure themselves by its Airline Trip
Insurance, and therefore, the insurer's motion for summary judg-
ment was properly denied.
The dissent observed that defendant insurer had marshalled
mountains of material to indicate on the basis of statutes, regu-
lations, opinions, reports, newspapers and magazines, that the
terms "scheduled airline" and "non-scheduled airline" or "non-
sked" have gained such general currency as to be part of ordinary
vocabulary. Therefore, it was argued, the insurer having reason-
ably decided to limit its liability to scheduled airlines, such a clear
restriction in the policy cannot be altered by the court, since
no ambiguity which would sustain decedent's claim was present."
"The test for ambiguity," the dissent suggested, "is not
subjective . . . the issue is, not whether the insured knew, but
whether she had reason to know, the content and purport of the
contract she signed." 7
2. Supra note 1 at 364, 118 N. E. 2d at 558.
3. Kenyon v. Knights Templar & Masonic Mlut. Aid Assn., 122 N.Y. 247, 254,
25 N.E. 299, 300 (1890)..
4. Hartol Products Corp. v. Prudential Ins. Co., 290 N.Y. 44, 49, 47 N. E. 2d
687, 690 (1943).
5. Supra note 1 at 365, 118 N.E. 2d at 559.
6. Houlihan v. Preferred Acc. Ins. Co., 196 N.Y. 337, 340, 89 N.E. 927 (1909).
7. Supra note 1 at 373-374, 118 N.E. 2d at 564, and cases cited.
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The position of the majority clearly indicates that when such
machines are used, together with advertising, to vend insurance,
a jury is justified in resolving conflicting inferences in favor of
the claimant.
Contract of Indemnity
In Madawick Contracting Co. v. Travelers Ins.. Co.,8 the in-
sured was a sub-contractor who, in a contract with the general con-
tractor, guaranteed to indemnify him should any liability for in-
jury to property arise as a result of performance by the sub-
contractor. The contract required the sub-contractor to secure
adequate liability insurance of various types, and provided that
any dispute arising under the contract was to be settled by arbi-
tration.
The subcontractor had previously secured insurance coverage
with defendant insurer, but the policy bore no reference to con-
tractual indemnification. An agent of the insurer read the con-
tract and subsequently the insurer appended an indorsement to
the policy, including by specific reference the contractual indem-
nity in question.
During the course of construction an injury to property
occurred and the general contractor invoked his right to indemnity
under the contract. The insured immediately notified the insurer
and demanded that it defend in accordance with the terms of the
policy, which provided that the insurer would defend any "suit"
in the insured's name, and would indemnify the insured for
amounts determined"... by judgment against the insured after
actual trial . . ."
The insurer refused to defend on the ground that the policy
in its terms applied only to a "suit" and not to arbitration, and
also contended that it would not be liable to indemnify the insured
for any award emanating from arbitration, since it could be bound
only by a "judgment" after "actual trial."
The insured sued for a declaratory judgment. The Court of
Appeals, reversing the Appellate Division9 and reinstating the
Special Term judgment,10 held that the terms of the policy must
be construed together with the contract to which it referred, and
concluded that the words "trial" and " I judgment" I were sufficiently
broad to encompass arbitration proceedings and an award arising
therefrom.
8. 307 N.Y. 111, 120 N.E. 2d 520 (1954).
9. 281 App. Div. 754, 118 N.Y. S. 2d 115 (2d Dep't 1953).
10. 202 Misc. 411, 114 N. Y. S. 2d 300 (Sup. Ct 1952).
